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CORRESPONDENCE
When conservation research goes awry: A reply to Mascia and Mills (2018)
In recent years, conservation scientists have embraced
insights from social science. We welcome this “social science
turn” in conservation as a promising path for engagements
with, among others, social conﬂict and the politics of
conservation.
In “When conservation goes viral: The diﬀusion of inno-
vative biodiversity conservation policies and practices,” Mas-
cia and Mills (2018) make a case for “diﬀusion of innovation
theory” to understand how conservation interventions spread,
drawing on evidence from Tanzania and the Paciﬁc. Based
on our research on Tanzanian CBNRM, we have two points
of contention. First, conceptualizing the spread of CBNRM
as the uptake of innovative policy through diﬀusion depoliti-
cizes CBNRMand ignores existing social science scholarship.
Second, the claim of “diﬀusion” builds on inﬂated statistics on
CBNRM in Tanzania.
First, rather than eager “adoption” and seamless “diﬀu-
sion,” CBNRM in Tanzania has spread through top-down,
donor-ﬁnanced implementation of technical and bureaucrat-
ically framed interventions. Community-Based Forest Man-
agement (CBFM) and Joint Forest Management (JFM), for
instance, were initially implemented through pilot projects
and later through donor-funded targeted government eﬀorts
(Lund, Sungusia, Mabele, & Scheba, 2017). Often, imple-
mentation required massive donor ﬁnancing over several
years, due to local political resistance and a technical-
bureaucratic framing (Scheba & Mustalahti, 2015). Similarly,
research on Wildlife Management Areas (WMA) shows that
they were implemented by State and NGO actors identify-
ing areas and “sensitizing” villages to join, often through
manipulation and inﬂated promises (Benjaminsen, Goldman,
Minwary & Maganga, 2013; Green & Adams, 2014). Mas-
cia and Mills’ conceptualization ignores these insights from
social science. In doing so, the authors evacuate politics from
CBNRMbymisrepresenting top-down conservation interven-
tions as innovations that can be freely adopted.
Second, Mascia and Mills’ story about Tanzanian CBNRM
relies on inﬂated statistics. The steeply inclining graphs in
Figure 1b in their article, indicating villages “adopting”
CBFM and JFM include ‘‘villages with signed agreements
and plans and those who are working towards this” (URT,
2012). Thus, rather than actual adoption, this includes villages
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that may only have been introduced to the idea of CBFM.
Data on villages having formalized CBFM and JFM show an
increase of a mere 80 CBFM villages and 22 JFM villages in 6
years (Lund et al., 2017). Thus, actual implementation stalled
and the graphs in Mascia and Mills' Figure 1b reﬂect devel-
opments on paper only. In reality, CBFM and JFM imple-
mentation has suﬀered from severe resource constraints since
donor attention shifted to REDD+ in the mid-2000s (Lund
et al., 2017; Pailler, Naidoo, Burgess, Freeman, & Fisher,
2015). Similarly, WMA statistics also belie on-the-ground
realities, as many WMAs are plagued by lack of investments
and competing land claims (Bluwstein & Lund, 2018). With
a few exceptions, WMAs are “in dis-array and terminal
decline” (Williams, 2017) and the initial plans to expand
from 16 pilots to 38 WMAs across Tanzania remain a mirage.
We object to the notion that the spread of Tanzanian
CBNRM policies can be understood through their relative
advantage in the eyes of village residents and their compati-
bility “with local values and norms” (Mascia and Mills, 2018
p. 6). Evidence clearly demonstrates that Tanzanian CBNRM
are technical-bureaucratic interventions that cannot be freely
“adopted,” but whose implementation, rather, follows interna-
tional donor funding priorities and often relies on manipula-
tion and inﬂated promises. Thus, Mascia and Mills’ apolitical
demand-driven theory of “diﬀusion of innovation” misrepre-
sents the reality of CBNRM.
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